A report prepared for the United States Congress has examined the possibility that Australia may ultimately not take delivery of nuclear-powered submarines under the AUKUS security partnership, highlighting alternative approaches to allied force posture in the Indo-Pacific.

The analysis, produced by the Congressional Research Service, explores scenarios in which submarines originally intended for Australia would instead remain under United States control while operating from Australian bases, reflecting internal assessments of naval capacity, alliance dynamics and long-term deterrence requirements.

The AUKUS framework, agreed in two thousand twenty-one by Australia, the United States and the United Kingdom, set out a plan for Australia to acquire three to five Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines from the United States in the early two thousand thirties, followed by the construction of a new class of submarines in Australia based on a British design.

The report outlines an alternative “division of labour” in which those Virginia-class submarines would stay in United States Navy service, forward-deployed alongside American and British vessels rotating through Australian facilities.

According to the analysis, one of the primary drivers behind this option is pressure on United States shipbuilding capacity.

American submarine production has struggled to keep pace with domestic naval requirements, raising concerns that transferring vessels to Australia could affect United States readiness.

The report also notes the sensitivity of nuclear propulsion technology and the risks associated with expanding access to highly classified systems, as well as the legal and operational implications linked to Australia’s status under international nuclear non-proliferation arrangements.

The document further suggests that, under such a model, Australia could redirect resources toward complementary defence capabilities, including long-range strike systems and advanced unmanned platforms, while hosting a greater permanent or rotational allied naval presence.

This, the report argues, could still strengthen collective deterrence and interoperability across the Indo-Pacific, even without Australia operating its own nuclear-powered submarines.

The report does not present the option as official policy, and both Washington and Canberra have publicly reaffirmed their commitment to the AUKUS submarine pathway.

Nonetheless, its inclusion in a formal congressional analysis underscores the scale of the industrial, financial and strategic challenges involved, and signals that alternative models are being actively considered as the partnership moves from ambition to implementation.